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Business Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978: An Analysis of Chapter 11

The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,' the first major revision of the bankruptcy laws in nearly forty years,2 became effective on October 1, 1979.3 The Reform Act clarifies, simplifies,
and modernizes the previous law, which had been unable to deal
with the vast twentieth-century changes in the amount and
treatment of debt.
Although the Reform Act includes many important changes,
this Comment will focus on perhaps the most significant substantive change: the consolidation of chapter VII (railroad reorganizations), chapter X (corporate reorganizations), chapter XI
(arrangements), and chapter XI1 (real property arrangements) of
the former act into the single reorganization chapter 11 of the
Reform Ad.
As a background for review of chapter 11 of the Reform Act,
the first Section of this Comment will briefly outline the history
of the reform movement, the reasons for the Reform Ad, and the
rudiments of the former reorganization chapters. The second
portion will proceed through chapter 11 of the Reform Act, highlighting the important changes and describing the reasons for
and effects of these alterations. The final section will make some
observations about the new act from the practitioner's point of
view, since the Reform Act promises to involve more practitioners than did the prior reorganization chapters. Because of the
relatively limited use of the railroad reorganization chapter of
the former act,' this Comment will not consider the changes in
1. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified in 11 U.S.C.A. $$ 101-151326 (West
1979); 28 U.S.C.A. $ $ 151-160, 581-589, 771-775, 1471-1482 (West 1979)) See Spivey,
Bringing Bankruptcy into Focus, 84 CASE& COM.3 (1979).
2. The previous law was essentially the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat.
544, as amended by Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1978).
3. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, $ 402(a), 92 Stat. 2549.
4. See Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary (pt. I),
94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 36 (1976) (statement of Berkeley Wright) [hereinafter cited as
Bankruptcy Act Revision Hearings]. The statistics cited show a total of 24 railroad reorganizations since 1940.
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that area.

A.

The Tremendous Increase in Bankruptcy Petitions

In the last thirty years of available statistics regarding the
use of the former act, there has been a phenomenal increase in
petitions for b a n k r ~ p t c y In
. ~ 1975, the year preceding congressional hearings on bankruptcy reform, the number of cases filed
reached a new peak. Over 250,000 cases were filed that year in
all types of bankruptcy proceedings, representing more than
double the other 117,320 civil cases filed in federal district
$

Among the factors leading to this increase are the great reliance American businessmen and industrialists have placed on
debt as a source of capital, and the equally great dependence of
consumers on credit for the purchase of goods and services.'
With the overwhelming increase in the amount of private debt
outstanding in the American economy, it is no wonder that
bankruptcies have increased so dramatically.
The vast majority of bankruptcies are straight personal or
consumer liquidation^.^ Of all the chapter X, XI, XII, and XIII
proceedings filed under the former act, the largest number were
filed under chapter XIII, the wage earner rehabilitation plan.@
Business bankruptcies, however, are not only increasing numerically, but are also accounting for a larger percentage of all bank5. HOUSECOMM.ON THE JUDICIARY,
REPORT
OF THE COMMISSION
ON THE BANKRUPTCY
LAWSOF THE UNITEDSTATES,
H.R. Doc. No. 137 (pt. I), 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1973)
OF THE COMMISSION
ON BANKRUPTCY
LAWS].
[hereinafter cited as REPORT
6. Bankruptcy Act Revision Hearings, supra note 4 , at 337 (statement of Vern
Countryman).
COMMISSION
ON CONSUMER
FINANCE,
REPORT
ON CONSUMER
CREDITIN
7. THENATIONAL
THE UNITED
STATES5-7 (1972).
8. Bankruptcy Act Revision Hearings, supra note 4 , at 337 (statement of Vern
Countryman).
9. Id. In 1975 about 90% of all chapter proceedings were filed under chapter XIII.
chapter XIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41,178 cases in 1975
chapter XII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280 cases in 1975
chapter XI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,506 cases in 1975
chapter X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 cases in 1975
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mptcies filed,lO consuming a significant portion of court time and
other resources of the bankruptcy system.
Despite the ever growing number of bankruptcies, their adverse economic impact is small when compared to the increased
standard of living that credit buying has given the consumer.ll
The cost is spread among all consumers, although the greatest
burden is borne by "customers of business borrowers, through
higher prices."12
The spiraling number of bankruptcies is not so much a
problem for the economy as it is for the bankrupt individuals
and the bankruptcy court system.13 The need for reform, therefore, did not center on the reduction of the number or dollar
amount of bankruptcies. l4 Rather, the need focused on flexibility
in the fair and equitable treatment of all parties, whether debtor
or creditor, as well as on the expenditious and streamlined handling of an ever-increasing case load.15

B.

The Inadequacy of Former Bankruptcy Legislation

With these needs in mind, Congress in 1970 established the
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States.16 The
Commission was to "study, analyze, evaluate and recommend
changes" in the Bankruptcy Act and the system of bankruptcy
administration.17In July 1973 the Commission reported its findings and recommendations to Congress, including the text of a
suggested bankruptcy code.
The Commission concluded that the former act did not
achieve the desired purposes of bankruptcy legislation.18 One
commentator summarized the purposes as follows:
The purpose of bankruptcy from the point of view of the
10. Id. Business bankruptcies hovered below 10% of all bankruptcies from 1946-1974.
In 1975, however, their portion of the total was 12%.
11. Id. at 341..
& M. GIRTH,BANKRUPTCY:
PROBLEM,
PROCESS,
REFORM
40 (1971). This
12. D. STANLEY
study was published by the Brookings Institution and is known as the "Brookings
Report ."
13. Bankruptcy Act Revision Hearings, supra note 4, at 341 (statement of Vern
Countryman).
ON BANKRUPTCY
LAWS,supra note 5, at 9.
14. REPORTOF THE COMMISSION
15. Id. at 11-12.
16. The Commission was established by S.J. Res. of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91354, 84 Stat. 468, as amended by S.J. Res. of Mar. 17, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-251, 86 Stat.
63, H.R.J. Res. of July 1, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-56, 87 Stat. 140.
17. Id.
18. See REPORTOF THE COMMISSION
ON BANKRUPTCY
LAWS,supra note 5, at 4-5.
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man deeply in debt, is relief. The purpose of bankruptcy from
the point of view of the creditor is to salvage some recovery
where it appears that the debt cannot or will not be paid in
full. The purposes of bankruptcy from the point of view of the
public are: (1)to return to useful production a man so harassed
by debt that he cannot do his work properly, and (2) to divide
fairly among the man's creditors such assets as he has?

One study, the Brookings Report, found that under the former system creditors received little from bankruptcy proceedings
and consequently they had little incentive to actively pursue
their claims. Instead, creditors passed their losses on to consume n and taxpayers in the form of higher prices or tax writeoffs.
The debtor, on the other hand, was often denied a "fresh start"
because of the large number of nondischargeable debts and security interests in essential property. Also, the debtor was often
persuaded to reaffirm many of the debts discharged, either to obtain further credit or out of a sense of moral duty.20
The Commission found a general lack of uniformity in the
application of bankruptcy law; similarly situated debtors were
accorded unequal treatment in various judicial districts.21Concerning this problem, the Brookings Report stated: "Even among
the federal bankruptcy courts there are striking differences in
policies. "22
With respect to business bankruptcies, the Commission's
findings showed that inordinate delay in the institution of proceedings was a major factor in the failure to meet creditor needs.
Often the debtor's assets were largely depleted before bankruptcy. The requirement that a creditor prove an act of bankruptcy prior to filing an involuntary petition contributed to a
general diminution of the value of a business, which generally is
already depleted because of debtor delay in seeking help? The
Commission found the business rehabilitation chapters to have
"detailed and overlapping rules regarding [their] availability
which frequently produce pointless and wasteful litigation as to
which chapter should be used in a particular case. . . . In addition, none of the chapters is precisely suited to the needs of
many common business situation^."^^ In sum, the Commission
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

1 D. COWANS,
BANKRUPTCY
LAWAND PRACTICE
4 1 (2d ed. 1978).
D. STANLEY
& M. GIRTH,supra note 12, at 59-61.
Bankruptcy Act Revision Hearings, supra note 4, at 4.

D. STANLEY
& M. GIRTH,supra note 12, at 2-3.
Bankruptcy Act Revision Hearings, supra note 4, at 14.

Id. at 23.
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found the former act disjointed, inflexible, and confusing. Despite frequent amendments, it was incapable of adapting to the
many changes in debtor-creditor relations that have occurred
since the former act's last major overhaul forty years

C. The Former Reorganization Chapters
Reorganization, as opposed to liquidation, is premised on
the theory that the assets of a business are more valuable when
continued in the productive capacity for which they were made
than when dismantled and sold piecemeal for use in another
business or for scrap. Liquidation is preferable only when the assets have little value as a continuing business relative to their
liquidation value, or when it is more economical to divert the use
of the assets to another form of productive ~apacity.~'
Under former law, business reorganization was completed
under three separate and mutually exclusive chapters,27and the
application of the chapters was determined by the "needs to be
served."28Chapter X was enacted in 1938 as a part of the Chandler Act to efficiently accomplish, by voluntary or involuntary
petition, the thorough financial reorganization of large, publicly
held corporations. It required rigid supervision by the court and
was a formal process involving (1) the substitution of an independent trustee for debtor's management if total debt exceeded
$250,000; (2) the active participation of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); (3) court approval of a plan prior to
the solicitation of acceptances; (4) the ability to affect the rights
of both secured creditors, unsecured creditors, and stockholders;
and (5) the administration of the absolute priority rule with respect to participation in the assets of the business? Use of chap25. Id. a t 1-5. Since the Chandler Act in 1938, see note 2 supra, debtor-creditor relations have been greatly altered by the general adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC), the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act,
Truth-in-Lending Act regulations, or other similar legislation.
26. Comment, SEC Intervention in Corporate Rehabilitation, 56 NEB. L. REV. 635,
636 (1977).
27. 11 U.S.C. § § 501-676 (chapter X), 701-799 (chapter XI), 801-926 (chapter XII)
(1976) (repealed 1978).
28. General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462, 466 (1956).
FEDERAL
BANKRUPTCY
REFORMACT,
29. J. TROST,L. KING& K. KLEE,THEPROPOSED
RESOURCE
MATERIALS
273 (1978). Chapter X also contemplated a complete reorganization
of the capital structure of the debtor corporation with the new structure based on a going-concern valuation of the enterprise, secured and unsecured creditor's interests being
proportionate to the value of their claims. See Bankruptcy Act Revision Hearings, Supra
note 4, at 339-40 (statement of Vern Countryman). The plan formulation was supervised
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ter X was lirnited,'O primarily because of the mandatory ouster of
the debtor's management and the application of the absolute
priority rule; also, the formal nature of the proceedings tended to
lengthen the reorganization process, which increased the costs
and often resulted in little return to the creditor^.^^ Thus, even
though chapter X was more versatile than other chapters as to
what debt could be affected in the reorganization, it was used in
less than ten percent of all business reorganization
Chapter XI, also added to the former act by the Chandler
Act of 1938, was intended for use by smaller nonpublic businesses. Because of its relatively quick reorganization procedures,
however, it was more often used by larger public companies
when a speedy reorganization process was imperative. A chapter
XI case was commenced by the filing of a voluntary petition by
any person who could file as a bankupt under section 22 of the
former act,33which defined those who could declare bankruptcy.
One reason this chapter was so often employed is that debtor's
management was not displaced by an independent trustee. The
plan, which could only be proposed by the debtor, could directly
affect unsecured debt only. Secured debt was often indirectly affected by the automatic stay provisions and by negotiations between debtor and secured creditors. Negotiation was made more
attractive to creditors by the possibility of a higher or more rapid
payment on the debt than would have been available under the
longer, more expensive chapter X proceeding." Since there was
no court approval required for acceptance solicitation, it could
be done either pre-petition or post-petition. The standard imposed by the courts in confirming the plan was the "best interests of creditors" test, which meant that to be approved, the
plan must provide creditors with at least what they would have
by the trustees and had to be approved by the court before it could be submitted to the
stockholders for their approval. Acceptance required approval by two-thirds majority in
each class of claims affected and by a majority of stockholders affected.
30. The limited application of chapter X is demonstrated by the fact that of 254,484
bankruptcies filed in the United States in 1975, only 189 were filed under chapter X. See
Bankruptcy Act Revision Hearings, supra note 4, at 337 (statement of Vern
Countryman).
& M. GIRTHsupra note 12, at 144-46.
31. D. STANLEY
32. Bankruptcy Act Revision Hearings, supm note 4, at 337 (statement of Vem
Countryman).
33. 11 U.S.C. § § 22, 706(3) (1976) (repealed 1978).
34. Downey, Ferriell, & Pfeiffer, The Proposed Bankruptcy Reorganization Provisions: A Comparison of the Current Law with Chapter 11 of H.R. 8200 and S. 2266, 18
SANTACLARAL. REV. 567, 583-84 (1978).
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received under a liquidation of the business.35This conceivably
left the difference between the liquidation value and the goingconcern value for the debtor (stockholders, partners, or others) .36
The SEC involvement was limited to that of a party in interest
with authority to petition for a conversion to a chapter X proceeding or for a complete dismissal where, in the SEC's opinion,
the "needs to be served" so required.37
Because of a limited scope, chapter XII, like chapter X, was
rarely used." It was available only to noncorporate entities that
owned property held as security for a debt. The primary purpose
required of a chapter XII plan was modification of the real property secured debt, but it could also affect unsecured debt.3eOnly
the debtor could propose the plan and, to be confirmed, it was
required to be in the "best interests of creditors." Such a case
was thus commenced by a voluntary petition only and usually
contemplated leaving the debtor in possession; however, on application by a party in-interest and for cause shown, the court
could appoint a trustee.40Solicitation of acceptances for a plan
was permitted anytime, since, like under chapter XI, court approval of plans was not required. The SEC could not be involved
in a chapter XII proceeding.
Chapter distinctions in business reorganizations long ago
lost their justification, if indeed any existed in 1938. The establishment of separate chapters at that time may have been largely
attributable to the inability of Congress and the bankruptcy bar
to agree on a uniform approach to reorgani~ations.~~
Chapter X
was normally too time consuming and rigid, while chapter XI
was limited to unsecured debt and contained too few public protections. Chapter XI1 had limited applicability and could not be
used by corporations. Although each chapter had separate advantages that ought to have been available to all business entities seeking rehabilitation, there could be no mixing of remedies
among chapters. The consolidation of these chapters into a sin35. 3 D. COWANS,
supra note 19, $ 936.
LAWREVISION,
H.R. REP. NO. 595, 95th
36. HOUSEJUDICIARY
COMM.,BANKRUPTCY
Cong., 1st Sess. 223 (1977) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. 95-5951.
37. 11 U.S.C. $ 728 (1976) (repealed 1978).
38. For the number of chapter XII petitions filed in 1975, as well as the number of
petitions filed under the other business reorganization chapters, see note 9 supra.
39. Anderson, A Practioner's Guide to Financial Rehabilitation Through Chapters
X-XIII of the Bankruptcy Act (pt. I), 24 LA. B.J. 203-207 (1976).
40. 11 U.S.C. $ $ 832, 844 (1976) (repealed 1978).
41. See H.R. REP. 95-595, supra note 36, at 223.
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gle chapter in the Reform Act, together with some much-needed
modernization and simplification, was a great step forward in
the uniform application of bankruptcy law.

A.

General 0bservations

Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 constitutes a major overhaul of chapter proceedings. While it most
closely resembles chapter XI of the former act, the new chapter
11 also represents a major innovation as it combines the advantages of the former chapters and introduces several new concepts." It is flexible enough to permit the fashioning of a proper
remedy to fit the circumstances of individual cases, yet provides
sufficient protection of public investors and creditors to prevent
unworthy debtors from avoiding debt obligations. Its streamlined
procedures resolve previous problems of unworkable and overlapping requirements among the different chapters, thereby working
toward the elimination of needless litigation and the hazards of
improper chapter selection. Reorganizations under the new chapter 11 will consume less time, promote greater equality of treatment among parties, retain more assets for the satisfaction of
debts, and because of its simplified format, will allow more practitioners to bring cases under it. "The net effect of the series of
reorganization principles is to retain the simplicity of an arrangement with unsecured private creditors while, at the same
time, to make the more complex reorganization less cumbersome
and quicker to process."43

B. Major Changes Introduced by t k Bankruptcy Reform Act
I.

Eligibility of debtors

Section 109 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act enumerates the
requirements for relief under the Act.44Basically, any individual,
partnership, or corporation residing in the United States or having a domicile, a place of business, or property within this country is eligible. The Reform Act retains the former act's exclusion
of both foreign and domestic insurance companies, banks, and
42. King, The New Bankruptcy Code: Many Improvements Over Earlier Law, NAT'L
L.J., Nov. 6, 1978, at 26, col. 1.
43. J. Tms~,L. KING& K. KLEE,supra note 29, at 279.
44. 11 U.S.C.A. 8 109 (West 1979).
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savings and loan associations, and there are specific provisions
for the treatment of railroads in subchapter IV of chapter 11.
With these few exceptions, any entity is eligible for relief under
the Reform Act.
*The adoption of these broad eligibility standards for all entities seeking rehabilitation rather than liquidation provides more
uniform application of the laws, greater flexibility as to remedies, and eliminates the hazards of improper chapter selection.45
Contrary to the restricted and exclusive relief available under
the various chapters of the former act, the Reform Act provides
the entire panoply of remedies to all applicants regardless of
size, amount of stock outstanding, or other distinguishing
fact01-s.~~
2. Commencement of a chapter 11 case

The Reform Act provides for both voluntary and involuntary
petitions." A voluntary petition is commenced by the filing of a
petition with the bankruptcy court by one who may be a debtor
under chapter 11." Such a filing constitutes an order for relief.
An involuntary petition may be commenced only under
chapters 7 or 11and only against certain entities.49When there are
twelve or more total creditors and their claims aggregate $5000
more than the value of the liens securing their claims, three
petitioning creditors must join to file a petition. If there are fewer
than twelve creditors, only one need sign the petition if that
creditor holds claims totaling at least $5000.50The petition filed
must allege that the debtor is generally not paying his debts as
they come due or that within 120 days prior to the petition a
custodian was appointed or took possession of the debtor's
property. The debtor must controvert the petition in a timely
manner or relief is granted. If he does controvert the petition, a
45. See, H.R.REP.95-595, supra note 36, a t 224.
46. Downey, Ferriell, & Pfeiffer, supra note 34, at 582.
47. 11 U.S.C.A. 9 9 301, 303 (West 1979).
48. Id. 9 301.
49. Id. Q 303(a). The entity must be able to be a debtor under the chapter under
which the case is commenced and the entity may not be a "farmer or a corporation that
is not a moneyed, business, or commercial corporation." As for what is meant by the
phrase "not a moneyed, business, or commercial corporation," the report of the House
Judiciary Committee, H.R.REP.95-595, supra note 36, at 322, explains that eleemosynary institutions such as churches, schools, and charitable organizations and foundations
are meant to be excluded.
50. 11 U.S.C.A. Q 303(b) (West 1979).

a
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trial is held to determine the debtor's viability?
The Reform Act draws upon the provisions of former chapter
X regarding involuntary petitions, but changes the conditions of
both the voluntary and involuntary petitions. Most of the differences deal with relaxation of the eligibility restri~tions.~~
The allegations necessary for the court to grant an order of
relief are new. Proof of one of the acts of bankruptcy53 is no
longer required. Alleging and proving an act of bankruptcy under
the previous law often delayed the institution of proceedings until the business was beyond help." Although these acts have
been abolished and a creditor's burden of proof made less onerous, the court may still require the posting of a creditor's bond to
compensate the debtor for damages should the court later determine that the petition was u n ~ a r r a n t e d . ~ ~
3. Administration of the debtor's estate

a. Creditor's committees. After the order for relief, the
court must appoint a committee of unsecured creditors and may,
upon request of a party in interest, appoint other committees
from ampng other types of claimants. The size or membership of
any appointed committee may be challenged by a party in interest and changed after notice and hearing if it is determined that
the committee is not fairly representative of the claims it was
meant to r e p r e ~ e n t . ~ ~
At a meeting where a majority of the committee is present,
each committee may, with the court's approval, authorize the
employment of attorneys, accountants, or other professionals to
perform services in its behalf. The professionals so employed are
prohibited from simultaneously representing any other entity in
the case by a "disinterestedness" requiredent." They may be
compensated from funds of the estate after a court hearing to
51. Id. 8 303(h).
52. For example, with an involuntary proceeding available to creditors of all potential chapter 11 debtors, an individual proprietorship, a partnership, or other business
entity may now,be confronted with an involuntary petition. This affords greater protection to creditors, who may use this new leverage to force a debtor into reorganization
before he becomes hopelessly insolvent or to negotiate concessions from the debtor in the
formulation of a plan.
53. See 11 U.S.C. § 21a (1976) (repealed 1978).
54. REPORTOF THE COMMLSSION
ON BANKRUPTCY
LAWS, supra note 5, at 14.
55. See 11 U.S.C.A. 5 303(e), (i) (West 1979).
56. Id. 9 1102.
57. Id. 4 1103(a)-(b).

BUSINESS REORGANIZATION

determine the amount, which is to be based on a reasonable
compensation standard? Limitations and guidelines on compensation are specified in the Act.5g
All appointed committees may actively participate in the reorganization process. They may investigate the financial condition and operation of the debtor's business, determine the desirability of the continuation of the business, consult with the debtor
in possession or the trustee concerning the administration of the
case, participate in plan formulation, request a trustee or examiner, and generally pursue the interests of those they represent?
The committees have standing to be heard on any issue, including a right to appeal an unfavorable court order, and they may
also file a plan if the debtor fails to propose or obtain a confirmation of his plan." These committees are an important part of the
reorganization process, since much of the negotiation that occurs
between the debtor and creditors is accomplished through them.
The Reform Act is premised on the notion that effective
creditor participation and control, as opposed to lawyer and largest creditor control, will better achieve the purposes of reorganization." Under prior law the committees were generally elected.
Provisions specifically allowed the creditors with the largest
claims and the highest priorities to dominate the committee
while those with smaller claims and lower priorities were often
excluded." An attorney was permitted to represent a particular
creditor and a committee as well, often increasing the influence
of the large creditors or, a t least, permitting the attorney to
dominate the committee and weaken creditor control.
b. Appointment of a trustee or examiner. Section 1104 of
the Reform Act, dealing with the appointment of a trustee or an
examiner, constitutes a departure from former law. The former
chapter X mandated the appointment of a trustee in every case
where total debt exceeded $250,000" (this would include nearly
every case for which chapter X had been used), and former
58. Id. 8 330(a).
59. Id. $ 8 328, 330, 331. Foremost among these limitations is that any compensation
received is subject to court approval. Employment may be on any reasonable terms, including a retainer, an hourly fee, or a contingent fee. The court may deny a fee altogether
if it finds the party is not disinterested.
60. Id. 8 1103.
61. Id. # § 1109, 1121.
62. H.R. REP. 95-595, supra note 36, at 235.
63. King, The Business Reorganization Chapter of the Roposed Bankruptcy
Code-or Whatever Happened to Chapters X, XI & XII, 78 COM.L.J. 429, 431-32 (1973).
64. 11 U.S.C. 8 556 (1976) (repealed 1978).
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chapter XI had no provision for the appointment of a trustee except the continuance of one appointed under another section?
Former chapter XI1 left the debtor in possession in nearly all
cases, except where a trustee was appointed under a prior filing
under another chapter or where, for good cause, the debtor was
replaced by a trustee.66
The Reform Act takes an intermediate position. It contemplates the debtor being left in possession in most cases, but provides for a trustee or an examiner upon certain conditions. This
reflects the belief that since in most cases there is no mismanagement or fraud, the debtor, who is most familiar with his business and his creditors, should retain possession."
Ousting a debtor's management in favor of a trustee requires
notice and a hearing at which a party in interest must show
fraud, incompetence, or gross mismanagement, or demonstrate
that such an appointment would be in the best interests of the
creditors, the stockholders, or the estate. If a trustee is not appointed, the court may, as an added protection to the creditors,
order an examiner to investigate allegations of fraud and other
irregularities if the debtor's unsecured nontrade and nontax
debts exceed $5,000,000, or if otherwise warranted.6s Significantly, however, there are no provisions for the appointment of a
receiver .69
A trustee, or a debtor in possession, is entrusted with various powers and duties, including the investigation of all matters
relevant to the case, the formulation and filing of an appropriate
plan, the filing of all necessary reports and statements, and the
continuation of the operation of the debtor's business.70 Other
more general powers accorded the estate or the trustee are delineated in broad provisions of other chapters of the Reform Act."
65. Id. 8 732.
66. Id. §§ 732, 832, 844. See also 3 D. COWANS,
supra note 19, 4 1055.
67. H.R. REP.95-595, supra note 36, at 233.
68.. 11 U.S.C.A. 4 1104(b) (West 1979).
69. King, supra note 42, at 26, col. 2.
70. 11 U.S.C.A. § § 1106-1108 (West 1979).
71. Proper execution of the duties of a trustee, or a debtor in possession, requires an
understanding of several significant sections of chapters 3, 5, and 7 as they apply to
chapter 11. See id. $ 4 323, 326, 345, 361-365, 521-554, 704.
Although not technically within the scope of this Comment, certain changes from the
previous law involving these provisions affect chapter 11 rehabilitation and are therefore
mentioned. The first are the automatic stay provisions of 4 362 of the Reform Act. Id. §
362. The changes were meant to correct two main inadequacies: incomplete coverage
from the debtor's point of view, and lack of provision for relief from a stay from the
creditor's point of view. Under 4 362 the automatic stay operates against all entities,
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Proper use of the powers vested in a trustee or debtor in possession should permit the reorganization of any truly viable
business.72
c. The equipment financing provisions. One of the more
significant, albeit controversial, sections in the Reform Act is the
provision covering aircraft equipment, vessels, and railroad rolling
Under the former law, exceptions to the automatic
stay provisions relating to transportation equipment allowed the
owner or financer of heavy and expensive equipment, stock, or
vessels to repossess according to the terms of the financing agreement, regardless of the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings. By providing for "bankruptcy-proof' agreements, these exceptions were designed to encourage the production and
financing of that type of property. The financing industry has
become dependent on this practice, and has alleged that it
would cease to operate in the absence of those exception^.'^ Unfortunately, the continued use of this equipment may be essential to the operation of a debtor's business, and may be critical
to successful rehabilitation.
The Reform Act modifies but does not eliminate the
financer's absolute right to repossess. The trustee has the right
to agree, within sixty days after the date of the order for relief, to
whether judicial or administrative (with certain common exceptions listed in 8 362(b)).
This coverage will allow the debtor enough time to formulate a rehabilitation plan free
from the harassment of collection efforts.
But the stay provision also allows a creditor to obtain relief from the stay if, after
notice and hearing, the court finds the creditor's interests will be harmed due to a lack of
adequate protection for the collateral. See id. 5 363. The court must act with reasonable
dispatch as well, since the stay is dissolved automatically after 30 days from the creditor's request for relief unless the court, after notice and hearing, orders its continuation.
There are also some significant changes from the previous law concerning property of
the estate. Under the former act, state law determined what property passed to a trust
for purposes of estate administration and whether or not such property was exempt. This
policy was rejected in the Reform Act, in favor of a uniform list of exemptions and a
single definition of property, id. 8 541, which will include any property interest of value.
The exemption provision, id. 8 522, will prevent the disparities found under former law,
and should provide the debtor with a "fresh start."
Preferential transfer rules have also been altered by the Reform A d by increasing
the trustee's ability to recover funds for the estate. Id. 8 547. The two major changes are:
(1) the preference period is now 90 days instead of the previous four months, and (2)
insolvency is presumed to exist for 90 days prior to filing of the petition instead of the
prior requirement of knowledge (actual or constructive) of the debtor's insolvency. These
changes will especially affect trade lending and secured transactions, but will also alter
the size of the estate to be reorganized in many cases.
'
72. J. TROST,L. KING& K. KLEE,supra note 29, a t 299.
73. 11 U.S.C.A. 8 1110-1168 (West 1979).
74. See H.R.REP. 95-595, supra note 36, at 239.
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perform the debtor's obligations under the financing agreement.
He may also agree to cure any default occurring before the order
for relief within the sixty-day period and to cure any default occurring after the order within thirty days after such default.
Only if the trustee fails to comply with these conditions may the
financer repossess according to the agreement.75
4.

The plan

The filing of a reorgainzation plan is governed by subchapter
11 of chapter 11, which contains several significant changes from
the former law. These changes may best be understood by answering six important questions with respect to the reorganization plan: (a) Who is eligible to file a formal plan? (b) What
claims may the plan affect? (c) How may solicitation of acceptances be conducted? (d) What classes of interests must accept
the plan, and what percentage constitutes acceptance by class?
(e) What standards must the court apply in determining whether
or not to confirm the plan? (f) What is the effect of a confirmed
plan?
a. Who is eligible to file a formal plan? Under the former
act, eligibility to file a formal plan varied under the different
chapters. The formulation of a plan under chapter X was restricted to the trustee. The debtor and creditors were limited to
negotiating with and suggesting plans to the trustee.'Vhen the
trustee presented a plan, an approval hearing was held at which
the plan was reviewed to determine whether or not it met confirmation standards. If approved, the plan was sent to the SEC for
a report and subsequent approval or objection. These requirements were meant to protect the public investor, but made the
process very lengthy, and deprived the creditors and debtor of
active participation.
Former chapter XI contemplated that only the debtor would
file a plan." The creditors' only alternative to acceptance was to
refuse their consent, thereby forcing renegotiation, dismissal, or
perhaps liquidation. The disclosure of information to creditors
was not closely monitored and was often minimal. Former chap75. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 1979). The most significant aspect of § 1110 is that the
transportation equipment provisions are extended to cover all business entities filing
under chapter 11. Under the former law, only financers of equipment for corporations
filing under chapter X were protected.
76. 11 U.S.C. 5 569 (1976) (repealed 1978).
77. Id. § 723.
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ter XI1 specified that the debtor and certain classes of creditors
could file plans but the plan could only affect certain types of
debt.78Again, disclosure of information to creditors was usually
limited.
The new eligibility requirements, by contrast, are not dependent upon the chapter proceeding utilized. Instead, the Reform Act establishes uniform criteria, governed in part by
whether a trustee has been appointed or the debtor has been left
in possession. The debtor may file a plan with the petition or a t
anytime thereafter, regardless of whether the petition was volun. ~ ~ no trustee has been appointed, the
tary or i n v o l ~ n t a r y When
debtor alone has the right to file a plan for 120 days after the
relief order is issued. If he files a plan within that time he has an
additional sixty days to obtain acceptances. If he fails to do so,
any party in interest may thereafter file a plan. Conversely,
where a trustee has been appointed, any party in interest including the debtor, creditors, trustee, or creditor's committee may
file a plan.80
Since the debtor will usually retain possession, he will be
granted this exclusive right to file for the given period of time.
While this is similar to chapters XI and XII under the 'former
act, the Reform Act goes a step further by placing a time limit
on that right. This limit should serve to make the debtor more
willing to negotiate and accommodate his creditors.
b. What claims may the plan affect?The new rules regarding what debts the plan may affect are regarded as among the
most significant changes found in the Reform Ad, and are expected to have an important impact on plan formulation, creditor participation and treatment, and rehabilitation success.81
Under the former act, one of the key criteria in determining
which chapter a debtor was to select was the nature of the
claims to be affected. For example, the proper action for a corporation seeking reorganization of secured debt was to proceed
under chapter X. But the threat of an ouster of the debtor's
management in favor of an independent trustee, the length of
the process, and the imposition of the absolute priority rule
caused many debtors to avoid chapter X. Instead they relied on
the less formal, but more limited chapter XI, even though the
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. 99 823, 866.
11 U.S.C.A. # 1121(a) (West 1979).
Id. 9 1121(b), (c).
Downey, Ferriell, & Pfeiffer, supra note 34, at 579-80.
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debtor's business might have been better rehabilitated through a
plan affecting secured and unsecured debt.82 Chapter XII had
other, equally unappealing limitations as an alternative to either
chapter X or chapter XI, chief among which were the restrictions
to real property security and the exclusion of corporations."
In sharp contrast to the former act, the Reform Act avoids
these chapter selection problems by providing in section 1123(b)
that a plan may impair "any class of claims, secured or unsecured, or of interests." This change, together with the broader
standards of eligibility, allows the plan of any eligible debtor to
affect any debt, whether secured, unsecured, equity interest,
public, or private. The plan may even amend the debtor's corpo. ~ requirement that the plan be acrate charter if n e c e s ~ a r y The
cepted by the creditors and confirmed by the court should adequately protect the creditors' and stockholders' interests. These
new guidelines for plan formulation emphasize negotiation,
agreement, and informed consent of all parties in place of the
more inflexible approach of the former act. The alterations
should greatly increase the flexibility of the reorganization procedures, a primary goal enunciated by drafters of the Reform AcV5
c. How may solicitation of acceptances be conducted?
Once a plan has been formulated, it must be transmitted to
holders of allowed claims or interests of each affected class for
their acceptance or rejection. Specified percentages or numbers
of individual claimants within each class must accept the plan
before it may be submitted to the court for confirmation.
The time and manner by which acceptance of a proposed
plan could be solicited from a claimant varied widely among the
former reorganization chapters. Chapter X required strict compliance with all SEC regulations governing an issue of securities.
Chapters XI and XII, on the other hand, had little or no regulation as to when solicitation could be conducted or what had to
be contained in the information given to claim or interest holders
when acceptance was s o l i ~ i t e d . ~ ~
Chapter 11 standardizes the solicitation requirements
82. REPORT
OF THE COMMISSION
ON BANKRUPTCY
LAWS,supra note 5, at 247. While the
chapter XI plan could not directly affect secured debt, it could indirectly affect it in
various ways. See note 34 and accompanying text supra. The more prevalent use of chapter XI as compared to chapter X is reflected in the statistics in note 9 supra.
83. See 11 U.S.C. $ 6 823, 866 (1976) (repealed 1978).
84. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1123(a)(5)(1) (West 1979).
85. H.R. REP.95-595, supra note 36, at 223.
86. See 11 U.S.C. $ $ 823, 866 (1976) (repealed 1978).
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through the introduction of an entirely new standard." Any solicitation after the commencement of a case must be accompanied by the plan or a summary of it plus a written disclosure
statement approved by the court as containing "adequate information." Court approval does not require a valuation of the
debtor nor of his assets. The disclosure statement itself may vary
as between classes of claims, but must be the same as between
members of the same class.88
"Adequate information" is defined as that amount of information necessary to provide the typical investor of the solicited
class with sufficient knowledge about the debtor and the plan to
make an informed judgment about the acceptability of the plan.
The adequacy of the disclosure statement is governed by bankruptcy law and not by SEC standards?@
The SEC is still expected to play an important role in the
application of the new standard, however. Court approval of the
disclosure statement is given only after notice and a hearing as
to its adequacy, and the SEC and any other interested federal or
state regulatory agency have an absolute right to appear a t the
hearing and express their views regarding the adequacy of the
information. In this new role, the SEC becomes an advisor to the
court regarding the adequacy of the protection afforded the public by the disclosure statement, but will not control the court's
action in any particular case.s0
87. 11U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (West 1979). See also J. TROST,
L. KING& K. KLEE,supra
note 29, at 323.
88. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)-(d) (West 1979).
89. Id.
90. A comparison with the previous law reveals a substantial alteration of the role of
the SEC in a reorganization proceeding under the Reform Act. Section 1109(a) of the
Reform A d grants the SEC the right to "appear and be heard" on any issue in a chapter
11 case, but it does not grant "party in interest" status to the SEC. This would prevent
the SEC from appealing a court order.
Although there is no direct grant of authority to object to the confirmation of a plan,
as is given to a party in interest in § 1128(b), the report of the House Judiciary Committee, H.R.REP.95-595, supra note 36, a t 409-11, expressly contemplates the SEC objecting
to plans it feels do not disclose adequate information. Indeed, one of the keys to the
workability of the adequate information standard of 9 1125 is SEC participation. The
effectiveness of the SEC's participation would be only minimal if it did not have the
ability to object. For cases involving pre-petition solicitation, the objection, if any, would
take place at the confirmation hearing instead of, as normally contemplated for postpetition hearings, at the hearing on the plan.
Chapter X of the former law accorded the SEC a much more substantial role. The
SEC was given the responsibility for the protection of public investors. Public investors
were assumed to have had too little control over the corporation or its officers and too
little knowledge of its affairs to adequately protect their own interests. In addition, the
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To further insure the independence of bankruptcy courts
from SEC regulations, the Reform Act also contains a "safe harbor" provision, which creates an exemption from regulations and
laws governing the offer, issuance, sale, or purchase of securities.
This provision permits creditors and certain others to solicit or
participate in the offer, issuance, sale, or purchase of a security
offered or sold under the plan free from potential liability under
the securities laws?
The Reform Act distinguishes between solicitations made
before and after the filing of a petition. Prior to commencement
of a case, a solicitation must comply with any applicable
nonbankruptcy regulations governing adequacy of disclosure,
whether it be SEC regulations or state securities regulations.
Where none are applicable, as in the case of smaller business
entities, a determination of the adequacy of the information disclosed is made at the confirmation hearing. Any pre-petition solicitation acceptances obtained in contravention of these standards are simply not counted as acceptances of the plan.g2
The purposes of the new standard are twofold. First, it is
thought that if adequate disclosure is provided to all affected
parties they will be able to make a sufficiently informed decision
about the plan without having the SEC or the court render an
opinion as to the "goodness" or "badness" of the plan.93Second,
the new standard increases the flexibility of the bankruptcy
courts to save large amounts of money over the strict and often
overly protective requirements of the SEC under chapter X,
while at the same time providing greater protection to investors
SEC was accorded party-in-interest status, and could act as an advisor to the court either at the court's request or with its approval. The SEC also performed an analysis of
the debtor's business and the plan where total debt outstanding exceeded $3,000,000. If
the total debt was less, and the court approved, the SEC could perform an analysis and
file a report. This scrutiny of the plan was to guarantee the "fair and equitable" treatment of all parties.
Under chapter XI, the SEC had a much less important role. Section 328 of the former act, 11 U.S.C. § 728 (1976) (repealed 1978), empowered the SEC (or any party in
interest) to request a transfer of the proceeding from chapter XI to chapter X or to dismiss the proceeding if the "needs to be served," General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 350
U.S. 462, 466 (1956), showed that, a chapter X proceeding would be more appropriate.
There was a presumption in favor of chapter X when readjustment of public debt was to
be included in the plan. In chapter XII, of course, there was no SEC involvement.
91. 11 U.S.C.A. 4 1125(e) (West 1979). See also H.R. REP. 95-595, supra note 36, at
408-10.
92. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1126(b) (West 1979).
93. H.R. REP. 95-595, supra note 36, at 226.
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than was granted under chapters X or XII.D4
d. What classes of interests must accept and what percent
constitutes acceptance by the class? The Reform Act provides
that each class of claims must either accept the plan or be
unimpaired by it.D5A class of creditors is deemed to have accepted the plan when creditors "holding two-thirds in amount
and more than one-half in number of the allowed claims of such
class" have accepted it! A class of stockholders is deemed to
have accepted the plan when two-thirds in amount of the allowed interests have consented to it?'
These standards are more stringent than the requirements of
the former reorganization chapters. In this particular aspect the
Reform Act resembles a combination of chapters X and XI.
Chapter X required acceptance by creditors holding two-thirds
in amount of the claims filed in each class before the plan could
be submitted to the court for its confirmation. Chapter XI required acceptance by creditors holding one-half in amount and
number of claims filed in each class. Neither required approval
of stockholders.D8
The requirement that one-half of the allowed claims of each
class must accept the plan provides smaller creditors some protection against the potential abuses of larger creditors. I t also
forces the debtor to provide in its plan for some degree of satis94. Id.
95. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a)(8) (West 1979). A claim is unimpaired if: (a) it is left
unaltered as to any of claimant's rights; or (b) any default of debtor is cured, the maturity of the claim is reinstated, the creditor is compensated for any damages occurring as a
result of default, and the rights of the claimant are not otherwise altered; or (c) the plan
provides that the claimant receive cash equal to the allowed amount of the claim or the
greater of any fixed liquidation preference allowed or the redemption value of the claimant's security. Id. § 1124.
This essentially means that the plan's proponent may confirm it without the consent
of a secured creditor by paying cash equal to the value of the secured party's collateral.
Likewise, confirmation without an unsecured creditor's or stockholder's consent may be
granted by paying cash equal to the greater of the liquidation value of the claim or the
redemption value of the security held by the stockholder (as determined by the terms of
L. REP.
the security). See In re Pine Gate Assocs., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] BANKR.
(CCH) 7 66,325 (N.D. Ga. 1976); J. TROST, L. KING& K. KLEE,supra note 29, a t 329-35.
Note also that even if a class is impaired under the plan, its acceptance for confirmation
purposes is still not mandatory if, after valuation of the debtor, that class retains no
interest in the reorganized value of the business.
96. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1126(c) (West 1979). Note that the two-thirds and one-half fractions are computed on the basis of two-thirds of the number of claims that were voted
rather than the total number proceeding. See H.R. REP.95-595, supra note 36, a t 410.
97. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1126(d) (West 1979).
98. 11 U.S.C. § § 579, 762 (1976) (repealed 1978).
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faction of the smaller or unsecured claimant in order to obtain
their approval. A more equal treatment of creditors is thus likely
to occur and greater participation by creditors is insured.
In the event that not all of the impaired classes of creditors
or equity security holders accept the plan offered by the proponent, the Reform Act incorporates but clarifies a "cramdown"
provision formerly found only in chapters X and XI1 (the two
least-used reorganization chapter^).^^ Particular cramdown rules
are found in section 1129 of the Reform Act. The first rule is that
a t least one class of claims must accept the plan before the court
may confirm it.loOThis requirement was adopted from the Senate
version of the Act; "class," as used, would include creditors'
claims or stockholders' interests. The "at least one class" provision prevents the approval of a plan over the dissent of all
classes.
The second rule allows the court to confirm a plan over the
dissent of a class upon a finding that the plan does not discriminate unfairly and that it is "fair and equitable" with respect to
each impaired, dissenting class. This means that if all classes
accept the plan, the "best interests of the creditor" test is employed to determine the fairness of the plan for confirmation
purposes. But if a class dissents, the plan may only be confirmed
over the dissenting class if the absolute priority rule ("fair and
equitable" test) is applied to the dissenting class and all classes
junior in priority thereto. The allowed amount of the claims of
that class must be paid in full before any junior classes may
share in the reorganization value of the business. The rule must,
in turn, be applied in the same manner to each class of lesser
priority.
99. See id. § § 616(7), 861(11).
100. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a)(10) (West 1979).
101. I&. § 1129(b). Specifically, the rule is applied as follows: (a) secured creditors
may have the plan confirmed over their objection if they are unimpaired or they receive
property equal to the "allowed amount" of their secured claim valued as of the effective
date of the plan. The "allowed amount" includes only up to the value of the property
securing the claim, not the full amount of the claim if it exceeds the value of that property. Thus the statute focuses on claims, not creditors. See H.R. REP.95-595, supra note
36, a t 415. "Property" includes both tangible and intangible property so that securities of
the debtor, or the reorganized debtor if a valuation has been completed, may be given t o
the creditor as part of the property given.
Unsecured creditors are subject to cramdown if the members of the class are
unimpaired, if they will receive property equal to the allowed amount of their unsecured
claims, or if no class junior to them will share in the reorganized business under the plan.
This codifies the absolute priority rule from the dissenting class down.
As to stockholders, the court may confirm over the dissent of a class if it is
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e. What standards must the court apply in determining
whether or not to confirm the plan? As a final part of the confirmation hearing, the court must make three findings independent
of the acceptances of the plan by impaired parties. First, the
court must find that each holder of a claim or interest within
each class has either accepted the plan (which could provide
more or less than the liquidated amount as long as there is an
agreement to accept the amount provided) or that under the
plan they will receive or retain property of a value not less than
they would receive if the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7
on the effective date of the plan.lo2This standard, essentially a
variation of the best interest test, applies to members of a class
that have refused acceptance of the plan where the class has accepted it by the required percentage and number.
Second, the court must find that the confirmation of the
plan is not likely to be followed by the subsequent liquidation of
the business or the need for further financial reorganization of
the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan unless
the plan so provides.lo3Such a determination would require a
close examination of the financial structure of the business,lo4the
cooperation of the creditors, the likelihood that the plan will accomplish eventual rehabilitation, and perhaps even a consideration of the capability of the reorganized debtor's management.
This standard is similar to the former chapter X feasibility standardlo5and is aimed at insuring the probable success of the rehabilitation effort. By contrast, the standards of former chapters
XI and XII were oriented more toward the creditors, and required only the probability that the creditors would receive the
amount provided for them by the plan. lo6 No direct consideration
was given to the resulting viability of the reorganized debtor.
Finally, upon the request of a governmental party, the court
may not confirm the plan unless it finds that the principal purpose of the plan is not to avoid taxes or to avoid section 5 of the
Securities Act of 1933.1°7
f. What is the effect of a confirmed plan? Once a plan has
unimpaired, if it receives its liquidation preference or redemption rights, if any, or if no
junior class in priority to it shares under the plan (applying the absolute priority rule).
102. 11 U.S.C.A. 4 1129(a)(7)(A) (West 1979).
103. Id. § 1129(a)(ll).
104. Downey, Ferriell, & Pfeiffer, supra note 34, at 605.
105. See 11 U.S.C. § 621(2) (1976) (repealed 1978).
106. See id. $9 766(2), 872(2).
10'7. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(d) (West 1979).

982

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I979

been confirmed it is important to determine who is bound by the
plan and what debtor obligations are discharged. It is also necessary to know the extent to which securities and those issuing the
securities held or issued under the plan are exempt from otherwise applicable securities laws.
Under the Reform Act, confirmation of a plan makes it
binding upon the debtor, creditors, equity holders, partners, entities acquiring property under the plan, and entities issuing securities under the plan, whether or not the claimant or entity
accepted the plan or was impaired by it.lo8The property dealt
with by the plan is at that point free and clear from all claims
and interests of creditors, stockholders, partners, etc., unless the
plan provides otherwise. The confirmation of a plan discharges
the debtor from any debt arising before the order of relief.lO@
Unless the plan indicates to the contrary, the confirmation also operates to terminate all rights and interests of stockholders and
general partners provided by the plan.ll@
There are, however, two exceptions to the general discharge
provisions. First, a confirmed plan will not discharge an individual from debts that could not be discharged if there were no reorganization plan? Second, there can be no discharge of debts
under a plan if the plan liquidates the debtor's assets and the
debtor would be denied discharge in a liquidation proceeding
pursued under section 727 of the Reform Act.l12
Despite areas where the purposes of the bankruptcy and securities laws coincide,lt3the rigidity of the securities laws may
often thwart the intended flexibility of the Reform Act. In such
areas of conflict, one desirable effect of a confirmed plan is that
it provides exemptions from certain aspects of securities laws.l14
Traditionally, these exemptions have been limited to the initial
108. Id. 9 1141(a).
109. Discharge does not relieve the debtor of debts that may be incurred during the
reorganization process, whether in operation of the business or in the funding of the plan.
110. 11 U.S.C.A. 9 1141(d) (West 1979).
111. Id. 9 1141(d)(2).
112. H.R. REP.95-595, supra note 36, at 418-19. Section 727 grants discharge except
where fraud, concealment, waste, or other wrongdoing on the part of the debtor is found,
which would indicate that the debtor was using the bankruptcy laws for the purpose of
avoiding his obligations.
113. See Comment, SEC Intervention in Corporate Rehabilitation, 56 NEB. L. REV.
635, 639 (1977).
114. For a discussion of one area of conflict involving the question of whether the
solicitation of acceptances may constitute an offer of a security, see notes 86-91 and accompanying text supra.

9611

BUSINESS REORGANIZATION

983

transaction, and not to resale or redistribution. This has
presented several problems, especially when the reorganized
debtor attempted to issue or sell securities already contained in
its portfolio under the confirmed plan. If the securities are not
exempt, a creditor receiving those securities may fall within the
SEC classification of an underwriter, and resale would violate
section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933.115The SEC has also argued that small classes of creditors receive securities of the
debtor under a "private placement" category that limits their
resale to not more than one percent every six months after an
initial waiting period of two years, unless the securities are registered prior to resale.l16
The former act tended to inhibit the success of the bankruptcy plan by providing too little protection for creditors who
accepted securities as part of the reorganization. Especially in a
cramdown, the creditor might have had no choice but to take the
securities and would have consequently been limited to a twoyear waiting period, after which he could sell only a small percentage of the total at any one time. Creditors were often forced
to take securities, but were able to realize very little on their
claims because of the resale limitations.
This situation is alleviated under the Reform Act by the exemption from securities laws of the issuance of certificates of indebtedness (other than equity securities) and the issuance of securities where they are given primarily in exchange for claims
against the debtor or equity securities of the debtor. The exercise
of any conversion privilege attached to such securities is also
exempt .l17
The Reform Act also provides a transactional exemption for
the sale by the debtor of securities of another nonaffiliated coiporation that he holds in his own stock portfolio on the date the
petition is filed, if the sale is conducted pursuant to a confirmed
plan. Other conditions are that the issuer of such stock must file
reports pursuant to section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of
l934,ll8 that the issuer be in compliance with all applicable requirements for trading that stock, and that the sale not exceed
115. H.R. REP.95-595, supra note 36, at 419-21. If the creditor takes more than 1%of
the securities with a view to distribution, he would, under Q 5 of the Securities Act of
1933, fall into the category of an underwriter. See 15 U.S.C. Q 77(e) (1976).
116. H.R. REP.95-595, supra note 36, at 237.
117. 11 U.S.C.A. Q 1145 (West 1979).
118. See 15 U.S.C. 9 78(m) (1976).
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four percent of the total amount of the class of securities outstanding. If the debtor desires to sell more than the four percent
limit, he must first sell four percent and then wait two years
before selling additional blocks of one percent at six-month
intervals.llg
The Reform Act also limits the definition of an underwriter
for bankruptcy purposes. The current definition of underwriter in
section 2(11) of the Securities Act of 1933 does not apply to creditors who take debtor's securities with a view to distribution.120 If
it did apply, the creditor would be forced to register the sale of a
debtor's securities or find another exemption. This exemption is
limited to a creditor who receives less than ten percent of such
securities, since with ten percent he becomes a "control person"
within the meaning of the Securities Act. Where the debtor issues securities, the disclosure statement is used in place of the
prospectus. lZ1
An offer or sale of securities under the plan is characterized
by the Reform Act as a public offering rather than a private offeringlZ2in order to prevent application of the restrictions of a
private offering under rule 144 of the SEC.
IV. THEPRACTITIONER'S
VIEWOF THE REFORM
ACT
For the most part, bankruptcy practice under the former
act, and especially that portion regarding business reorganization, was left to those few members of the bar specializing in the
field.lZ3This situation was generally attributed to the complexity
of the reorganization chapters and cases.lu The effect of this exclusive practice was the emergence of an exclusive "bankruptcy
bar," which consisted of a relatively small group of attorneys
wh'o could and often did represent more than one party in a
bankruptcy proceeding, despite potential conflicts of interest.'=
This situation tended to increase lawyer control at the expense of
party participation, especially by creditors. It also tended to
minimize the effectiveness of the attorney's service to his clients
119. 11 U.S.C.A. 6 1145(a)(3) (West 1979).
120. Id. 8 1145(b)(l), (2).
121. H.R.REP.95-595, supra note 36, at 238.
122. 11 U.S.C.A. 6 1145(e) (West 1979).
123. Anderson, supra note 39, at 203.
124. Id.
125. Surbin & Rugheimer, A Statistical Study of Bankruptcy in Massachusetts,
With Emphasis on the Bankruptcy Bar and an Examination of the Roposed Banlzruptcy
L.J. 137, 154-59 (1976).
Acts, 50 AM. BANKR.
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in his traditional role as an advocate in an adversary system.
Such situations almost inevitably lead to abuses by a few
attorneys.
Many of these problems will be alleviated under chapter 11
of the Reform Act. The consolidation of the reorganization chapten, together with the simplification and modernization of procedures, will allow a greater number of lawyers to participate in
bankruptcy practice without the need of specialization in the
field. In addition, the Reform Act requires "disinterestedness,"
thereby preventing a single attorney from representing two or
more parties in most cases.12eSuch a requirement will motivate
the attorney to more actively represent his client's interests since
he will not be faced with the conflicting interests of other clients
in the same proceeding. A tangential advantage to the bar is the
possibility that the quicker, simpler process of bankruptcy may
attract more beleaguered business debtors, who have previously
regarded bankruptcy reorganization as a last resort simply because of the time and expense involved.lf7
Finally, it is important to consider the potential improvement of public relations the bar may enjoy as a result of streamlined, more serviceable bankruptcy legislation. The Reform Act
will undoubtedly serve the public better, and clients involved in
bankruptcy proceedings-either as debtors or creditors-will retain better impressions of their own counsel and the entire bar.

The consolidation of all reorganization chapters into a single
chapter under the Reform Act will have a marked beneficial impact. The benefits should be fairly immediate, but will increase
as the bar becomes familiar with its improvements and the advantages available to their clients. Perhaps the greatest advantages will be the simplicity of approach and the greatly increased
flexibility granted the parties. The effort to successfully rehabilitate a potentially viable debtor is not limited by unnecessary requirements. These charaeteristics will better enable the bankruptcy system to fulfill the purposes of bankruptcy legislation.
As with any extensive change in legislation, the implementation of the Reform Act may reveal some defects. But whatever
126. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1103 (West 1979).
127. Bankruptcy Act Revision Hearings, supra note 4 , at 436 (statement of Patrick
A. Murphy).
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the defects, the Reform Act will likely be a major improvement
over its predecessor chapters.
Don J. Miner

